UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS **HOUSTON DIVISION**

In re ENRON CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION This Document Relates To: MARK NEWBY, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs, v. ENRON CORP., et al. Defendants. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs. v. KENNETH L. LAY, et al. Defendants.



Civil Action No. H-01-3624 (Consolidated)

THE BANK DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

Defendants Bank of America Corporation, Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Citigroup, Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays PLC, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (collectively referred to as the "Bank Defendants") file this Motion to



Modify Scheduling Order and Request for Expedited Consideration, and respectfully show the Court as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Bank Defendants have been precluded, despite their diligent efforts, from obtaining class certification discovery due to a mandatory statutory stay on all discovery in this action during the pendency of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Class discovery is essential to enable Defendants to formulate an evidentiary response to Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Accordingly, the Bank Defendants respectfully request that the Court's Scheduling Order in this action be modified to allow a reasonable time for class discovery after the Court rules on Defendants' pending Motions to Dismiss, and to allow for briefing on class certification issues after the close of class discovery.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

On February 27, 2002, prior to the filing of the Consolidated Complaint and the addition of the Bank Defendants to this action, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, which provided as follows:

- 1. Consolidated Complaints filed by April 1, 2002;
- 2. Motions to Dismiss due May 1, 2002;
- 3. Oppositions to Motions to Dismiss due June 3, 2002;
- 4. Replies to Oppositions to Motions to Dismiss due June 17, 2002;
- 5. Class Discovery begins July 1, 2002;
- 6. Class Discovery ends September 2, 2002;
- 7. Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification due October 1, 2002;

- 8. Defendants' Oppositions due November 1, 2002; and
- 9. Plaintiffs' Replies due December 2, 2002.

As required by the Scheduling Order, all Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss on May 8, 2002.¹ The filing of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss effected an automatic, statutory stay of discovery and other proceedings pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), which provides that "all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss." *See* 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); *see also* this Court's Order dated August 5, 2002 (the "August 5 Order"), at p. 4 n.2 (Instrument #983, attached hereto as Exhibit A) (discussing the PSLRA discovery stay). The PSLRA stay will not be lifted unless and/or until the Court enters an order denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, which are currently pending. *See* August 5 Order at pp. 4-5.

Despite the PSLRA stay, which came into effect after the entry of the Scheduling Order, the Scheduling Order appears to direct that class certification discovery was to begin on July 2, 2002 and end on September 2, 2002. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, the Bank Defendants, and others, attempted to comply with the Scheduling Order by serving written class discovery requests on the class representatives, and by noticing the class representatives' depositions, all the while preserving Defendants' objections that all discovery is subject to the PSLRA stay. *See, e.g.*, The Bank Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents to All Class Representatives, at p. 2 n.1 (attached hereto as Exhibit B) (preserving the Bank

¹ Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss on May 8, 2002 rather than May 1, 2002 because on March 22, 2002 the Court entered an order that extended the deadlines in the February 27 Scheduling Order by one week for item numbers 1-4 above. The March 22 Order did not alter the deadlines in the February 27 Scheduling Order for item numbers 5-9 above.

Defendants' objection that all discovery is subject to the automatic PSLRA stay which is still in effect); and Notice of Deposition by Bank Defendants (attached hereto as Exhibit C).

On August 5, 2002, in the middle of the Scheduling Order's class discovery period, the Court entered an Order recognizing that "all discovery is STAYED, pursuant to the PSLRA, until the Court has ruled on the pending motions to dismiss." *See* August 5 Order, at pp. 4-5. In compliance with the August 5 Order, all parties ceased class discovery in this action.² The noticed depositions of the purported class representatives did not occur. Moreover, in apparent reliance on the Court's order, the purported class representatives declined to respond to any of the class discovery requests after August 5, 2002. Class discovery served on the purported class representatives that is unanswered or not fully answered includes the following:

- Defendant Lou L. Pai's First Set of Interrogatories to all Named Plaintiffs Regarding Class Certification Issues (attached hereto as Exhibit D);
- Defendant Jeffrey K. Skilling's First Set of Interrogatories to All Named Plaintiffs Regarding Class Certification Issues (attached hereto as Exhibit E); and
- The Outside Director Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents to all Named Plaintiffs Regarding Class Certification (attached hereto as Exhibit F); and
- The Bank Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents to All Class Representatives (attached hereto as Exhibit B).³

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² In contrast, class discovery continued, and was completed, in *Pamela M. Tittle et al. v. Enron Corp. et al*, H-02-3913, because the parties agreed that class discovery in that action was not subject to the PSLRA stay. Accordingly, the Bank Defendants in *Tittle* are not seeking any modification of the class discovery schedule with respect to the *Tittle* case, and will file their opposition to the *Tittle* plaintiffs' motion for class certification on November 1, 2002.

³ On August 2, 2002, prior to the entry of the August 5 Order, Plaintiffs served objections to Outside Director Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents to all Named Plaintiffs Regarding Class Certification and The Bank Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents to All Class Representatives. To date no documents have been produced by Plaintiffs pursuant to these requests.

On August 13, 2002, the Lead Plaintiff, the Regents of the University of California (the "Regents"), filed a Motion for Protective Order that recognized the Court's August 5 Order staying discovery, stating that the Order "stayed the noticed 'class certification' depositions and accompanying document discovery requests." See Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, at p. 1 (instrument #1000, attached hereto as Exhibit G). The Regents' Motion requested the issuance of a protective order limiting the scope of class discovery that the Bank Defendants may take of the purported class representatives, if and/or when the discovery stay is lifted. See id.

The Regents filed their Motion for Class Certification on October 1, 2002. The Bank Defendants then conferred with the Regents and requested an extension of the deadline for Defendants' Oppositions to the Motion for Class Certification to a date that would allow class discovery to be taken. The Regents opposed any such extension of the deadline for Defendants' Oppositions. For the reasons set forth below, the Bank Defendants request that the Scheduling Order be modified to permit class discovery after the Court rules on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and to extend the deadline for Defendants to file their Oppositions to the Motion for Class Certification until after the close of class discovery.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF THE COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER

A. The PSLRA Discovery Stay Has Precluded Defendants From Obtaining Class Certification Discovery.

As explained above, the Bank Defendants, and others, initiated class certification discovery within the deadlines set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order. However, as

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⁴ In its August 13 motion, the Lead Plaintiff refers to the August 5 Order as the August 7 Order, the date of entry by the clerk. *See* Exhibit A.

recognized by the Court in its August 5 Order, the filing of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss effected an automatic, statutory stay of all discovery pursuant to the PSLRA that has precluded class certification discovery from going forward. Moreover, both the purported class representatives and Defendants relied on the August 5 Order as confirming that class discovery is stayed.

The Regents now seek to take unfair advantage of the PSLRA stay by filing a Motion for Class Certification, but opposing an extension of the response deadline to a date that would allow reasonable class discovery to be taken.

B. Class Certification Discovery is Necessary for Defendants to Respond to the Regents' Motion for Class Certification.

On October 1, 2002, the Regents filed their Motion for Class Certification. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, all Defendants' Oppositions to the Regents' Motion are due on November 1, 2002. The Bank Defendants respectfully request that they be afforded an opportunity to conduct class discovery prior to responding to the Motion for Class Certification.

A plaintiff seeking class certification bears the burden of establishing that all requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 have been satisfied. *See Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp.*, 257 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2001), *reh'g denied*, 279 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2002); *see also* FED. R. CIV. P. 23. That burden is not met by conclusory allegations. Instead, a plaintiff must satisfy the Court after its "rigorous analysis" that the prerequisites for class certification have been met. *See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1982); *Castano v. American Tobacco Co.*, 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996). Such an analysis cannot be undertaken without an adequate

factual record.⁵ Indeed, Courts have long recognized that discovery is essential to determine whether the requirements for certifying a class action have been satisfied.⁶ See Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1978) (reversing grant of class certification where court refused to permit defendant to take class certification discovery); Pittman v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 552 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating "a certain amount of discovery is essential in order to determine the class action issue and the proper scope of a class action").

Defendants should be permitted to take discovery as to whether the Regents and the other purported class representatives have satisfied each of the requirements of Rule 23, including, but not limited to, the issues set forth in the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Compaq*:

- the relationship between the plaintiff and the proposed class counsel;
- the plaintiff's willingness and ability to take an active role in and direct and control the litigation;
- the plaintiff's knowledge of the facts and the source of the plaintiff's knowledge; and
- possible conflicts of interest between the plaintiff and other class members.

⁵ The Regents themselves acknowledge that discovery is necessary in their Motion for Class Certification. *See* the Regents' Motion for Class Certification, filed October 1, 2002, at p. 13 (stating "The exact number of Class members is presently unknown and can be ascertained only through discovery, which is presently stayed").

⁶ Moreover, in securities cases where discovery is stayed pursuant to the PSLRA due to pending motions to dismiss, it is appropriate for a court to first rule on the motions to dismiss prior to considering the issue of class certification. See Winn v. Symons Int'l Group, Inc., 2001 WL 278113, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2001).

See Compaq, 257 F.3d at 479-84. Without an adequate factual record, this Court cannot conduct the required "rigorous analysis" regarding whether the Regents and the other purported class representatives have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.⁷

C. Class Certification Should Follow the Court's Rulings on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

It is premature for the parties to engage in class certification efforts until after the Court rules on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Court's ruling on the various Motions to Dismiss may impact the make-up of the class that Plaintiffs will seek to certify, and may impact the causes of actions available to those seeking certification. Proceeding with class certification discovery and briefing at this stage runs the risk that the parties and the Court will have to revisit these issues with additional briefing after the Court has ruled on the Motions to Dismiss. Without the benefit of the Court's ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the parties' class certification briefing is based on no more than surmise as to what this Court will do with the Motions to Dismiss. Accordingly, class certification efforts should be deferred until the parties know what claims, if any, this Court will allow to go forward.

Further, in the interest of conserving both the parties' and the Court's resources, class discovery and briefing should take place after the Court has ruled on the Motions to Dismiss. If the Court grants the Motions to Dismiss, even as to some parties or claims, the scope of the class discovery and certification effort could be reduced for both the parties and the Court. The Court and the remaining parties would then be able to focus their class certification efforts on only those issues presented in Plaintiffs' Complaint that have been sustained by the Court, if any.

⁷ The need for class certification discovery is discussed further in the Bank Defendants' Opposition to Lead Plaintiff the Regents' Motion for Protective Order, dated August 30, 2002

THE BANK DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION

D. "Good Cause" Exists for Modification of the Court's Scheduling Order.

Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a scheduling order may be modified by leave of the district judge upon a showing of "good cause." *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). Defendants have shown "good cause" for modification of the Court's Scheduling Order in this case. Defendants have exercised diligence by initiating class discovery within the deadlines set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order. Despite Defendants' diligence, they were unable to complete class discovery prior to the Scheduling Order's September 2, 2002 deadline due to the PSLRA's mandatory discovery stay. Without class discovery, Defendants are unable to respond thoroughly to Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is both essential and proper that the parties be afforded an opportunity to take class discovery prior to resolving the class certification issue. The Bank Defendants respectfully request that this Court modify its Scheduling Order to provide that, in the event the Court denies Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Defendants be allowed a reasonable period of time after that ruling to conduct class certification discovery of the Regents and the other proposed class representatives. Additionally, the Bank Defendants respectfully request that the Court modify its Scheduling Order to allow Defendants a reasonable period of time after the close of class discovery to file their Oppositions to Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. The Bank Defendants respectfully request such other relief to which they may be justly entitled.

The Bank Defendants respectfully request that the Court consider this motion to Modify the Scheduling Order on an expedited basis. Pursuant to the Local Rules for the Southern District, this motion will not be ripe for decision until 20 days after its filing. As such, the Court's ruling would be after the time for the Bank Defendants to file their Opposition to the Regents' Motion for Class Certification. Therefore, the Bank Defendants respectfully request that the Court consider this motion on an expedited basis.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

On October 4, 2002, I conferred with counsel for The Regents of the University of California regarding this Motion. The Regents oppose this motion.

Gregory A. Markel

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was served on all counsel on the attached service list electronically via the www.esl3624.com website or as otherwise indicated in the Court's prior orders.

Patricia L. Casey

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The Exhibit(s) May

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